Introduction
Ritual-like behavior appears to have been a part of the Homo behavioral repertoire for hundreds of thousands of years, with evidence of Neandertal burial dating back ~300kya (Rendu et al., 2014) . The ubiquity of such actions in modern Homo sapiens, and their general absence in our closest living relatives, suggests an adaptive role. Rituals solve evolutionary and cultural problems, including bonding and cooperation (Konvalinka et al., 2011; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer, 2014; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009 ), commitment to group values (Ensminger, 1997; Henrich, 2009; Irons, 2001; Ruffle & Sosis, 2007; Sosis & Ruffle, 2003) , and transmission of normative and cultural information (Atran & Henrich, 2010; Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Rossano, 2012; Schjoedt et al., 2013; Sosis & Bressler, 2003) . While the effects of ritual are well documented, less is understood regarding the cognitive mechanisms that bring these effects about. Ritualized actions can be recognized for their repetition, redundancy, stereotypy, and formality Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Eilam, Zor, Szechtman, & Hermesh, 2006; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rappaport, 1999; Rossano, 2012) .
Such actions also feature causal opacity and goal-demotion: qualities which can apply to the whole sequence of actions ('ritual'; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013) . While many ordinary behaviors embody these qualities (as with the repetition of cleaning, or the formalities of social life) rituals feature these qualities in conjunction and often without instrumental justification. In the absence of a rich exegetical history associated with particular actions (as is often the case with religious rituals) both causal opacity and goal-demotion, which are common qualities of many rituals, allow observers to identify an action sequence as a ritual rather than as an ordinary alternative (Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013) , thus cuing different behavioral and cognitive responses.
However, not all rituals are created equal. Rituals may not be causally opaque, nor goal demoted (nor do they always occur simultaneously). Religious rituals, for example, typically have a great deal of history and exegetical justification (which means they are not goal-demoted), and may involve instrumental outcomes, such as making something clean (which means they are causally transparent). Hereafter, we refer to the phenomenon under consideration as ritualized behavior (as defined in the first paragraph) and refer to sequences of ritualized behaviors, not as 'rituals', but as ritualized actions. This terminology has been used in order to avoid confusion or conflation with other kinds of ritual, particularly religious rituals.
Causally opaque actions (like crossing one's fingers for good luck) deny observers intuitive access to the mechanism by which the action causes an effect.
According to a number of authors such actions obfuscate instrumental interpretations due to a "decoupling of an action sequence's causal dependency structure" Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Legare & Wen, 2014; Legare, Whitehouse, Wen, & Herrmann, 2012; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, 2015; Schjoedt et al., 2013; Watson-Jones, Legare, Whitehouse, & Clegg, 2014) . Conversely, causally transparent (ordinary) actions can be easily and intuitively understood (as is the case with hammering a nail into wood). While causal opacity describes whether or not an action sequence has an observable potential mechanism, goal-demotion refers to an observer's ability to infer and understand an actor's reason (e.g., goals or motivations) for a given action sequence Keren, Fux, Eilam, Mort, & Lawson, 2013; Nielbo & Sorensen, 2011; Schjoedt et al., 2013) . Put simply, causal opacity begets the question 'by what mechanism is an effect being caused' while goal-demotion begets 'Why does the actor act?'. Rituals tend to be both opaque and goal-demoted, and as a result, are rarely dissociated in the literature.
When we perceive an action as opaque and goal-demoted we recognize it as deliberate (not incidental or accidental) and adopt the ritual stance; via conventional and affiliative motives we make normative and social inferences which inform our subsequent behavior (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielsen et al., 2015) . This has been demonstrated in children (DiYanni, Corriveau, Kurkul, Nasrini, & Nini, 2015; Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & Whitehouse, 2015; Nielsen et al., 2015) and adults (Ensminger, 1997; Henrich, 2009; Irons, 2001; Ruffle & Sosis, 2007; Sosis & Ruffle, 2003) . Furthermore, artificial neural networks have been shown to learn how to discriminate between ritualized and nonritualized action sequences (Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013) . But what are the proximate and ultimate explanations for discriminating between ritualised actions and non-ritualized actions? What cognitive mechanisms or systems are responsible?
According to and ritualized behavior constitutes the elements of ritual. They argue that ritualized actions are 'partly parasitic' on cognitive systems adapted to serve other purposes and that cultural rituals are a by-product. These systems, identified respectively as the Hazard-Precaution and the Action Parsing system, are design to detect inferred threat and potential harm to protect the organism, but misfire in the case of ritualized action 1 . The 'proper functional range'
of activation is a range of stimuli calibrated by evolution adaptive to the organism, while the 'actual domain' includes an extended range of stimuli, not shaped by evolution, which share a sufficient number of features with 'proper' stimuli. For example, children may adaptively avoid dangerous foods by virtue of taste cues -like bitterness -but may incorrectly reject palatable food -like broccoli -as a result (Wardle & Cooke, 2008 Ritualized actions share many features and cues with 'proper' threat response, and tend to disrupt the level at which the actions are analysed and interpreted, arresting the system, a phenomenon known as 'cognitive capture' Zacks, 2004a Zacks, , 2004b Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007) . There are three hierarchical levels of action parsing: 'Scripts' 'Behavior', and 'Gesture'. The default level is Behavior. For example, 1 A great deal has been written on Action Parsing independent of these authors. See Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013; Zacks, 2004a Zacks, , 2004b Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007. you might observe someone in a kitchen and describe their behavior as {cleaning a Our systems are arrested when cognitive predictions are disrupted by errorchecking processes. When actions are goal demoted and causally opaque we are forced to parse at a gestural, rather than a behavioral, level Watson-Jones et al., in press; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001 ). However, we are motivated to return to the default level of interpretation, and so we attempt to attribute and infer meaning (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rossano, 2012; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Schjoedt et al., 2013; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013) . Causal opacity has been discussed in the literature in depth Nielsen et al., 2015; Schjoedt et al., 2013; Watson-Jones et al., 2014) . In a recent study Kapitány and Nielsen (2015) showed that objects subjected to opaque actions were reported as more special and desirable compared to objects subjected to transparent actions. Providing benign social context increased this effect, while aversive context had no influence. They concluded that ritualized actions are interpreted normatively. Unlike causal opacity, goal-demotion has been less explored (but see: Keren et al., 2013; Mitkidis, Lienard, Nielbo, & Sorensen, 2014; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013 ).
In the current study we directly manipulate and dissociate causal opacity and goal-demotion. Participants were shown a series of videos featuring an actor performing actions on sets of identical glasses containing an amber liquid. Actions were presented as either ritualistic (causally opaque) or ordinary (causally transparent) and were accompanied with a description of the actor's intentions ('goals') as either a blessing or a curse, or were left without a description. We chose to employ two opposite-valence goals in order to better assess the magnitude of any potential effect (as we anticipate they will elicit different responses). All actions were described as belonging to a specific benign ritual tradition. After viewing the videos participants responded to questions addressing whether each glass was the 'same' and/or 'special', and which they'd most like to drink from.
Our predictions derive from the ritual stance (that ritualistic actions are interpreted normatively). We hypothesised that objects subjected to ritualized actions (opaque actions) would be rated as more special and desirable (i.e., they would be chosen as the glass to drink from) than objects subjected to ordinary (transparent) actions.
Additionally, compared to no goal information, blessings (positive goal information)
would increase desirability, and curses (negative goal information) would decrease it. We made no predictions regarding the 'same' question, as this question primarily serves as an attention-check , found judgements of 'sameness' to be unaffected by the types of actions presented).
Methods

Participants
Participants were recruited via mTurk and were offered $1.20(US) for their time.
Based on the methods and analyses of Kapitany and Nielsen (2015) , and an informal pcurve analyses conducted on those findings (unpublished), we made an a priori decision to attempt to collect 100 participants per cell. Data was collected in a single wave, and no ad hoc decisions were made to alter the desired N. A total of 694 people accepted the initial HIT, but 170 immediately dropped out. A further 22 completed less than 51% of the key questions and were omitted from the final dataset. Finally, we deleted 19 participants from condition 5 (Ordinary / Blessing), as experimenter error compromised their data (they were accidentally given a question from condition 3 -Ritual / Blessing).
The final sample comprised 484 participants (Mean age = 34.34 years, SD = 11.18). Of these, 41.5% completed a tertiary degree, 10.4% held a Post-graduate degree, 29.0%
reported some tertiary education, and 18% had only completed high school, 1% reporting 'some high school' and 1 participant did not provide a response. The majority of participants (48.3%) earned less than $25,000(US) annually, 13.3% earned between $25,001 and $35,000, and 18.5% earned more than $45,001 annually. Participants comprised 57.6% males and 42.2% female (with one value missing; note that we also provided a third option, 'other', for gender. It was not used). Possible gender effects were examined in analyses (upon peer-review) but did not indicate any cause for concern, as a result, all analyses disregard gender information.
Procedure
Participants were briefed and randomly assigned to one of six conditions that 
Materials
Following Kapitány and Nielsen (2015) , half of the videos used in this experiment featured novel ritualized action sequences (causally opaque, goal-demoted actions). The other half were matched sequences of ordinary actions (causally transparent, goalapparent actions). There were three examples of each type of video in each category. All videos involved pouring a liquid from a small glass into a large glass, where superficial features of the procedure were varied according to condition 2 . All videos are available upon request.
Both ritual and ordinary videos followed identical formats (see Figure 1 ). In which an experimenter presented a number of large glasses, performed a condition-2 Examples of videos are available at www.rohankapitany.com specific action on them, and poured an amber liquid from a smaller glass into the larger glass. The ritual condition included additional redundancy and concluded with the experimenter bowing to the glass (it was simply inspected in the ordinary condition). As per Kapitány and Nielsen (2015) , videos belonged to one of three discrete blocks of stimuli. Block 1 involved one action performed on one of two glasses, Block 2 involved one action on one of three glasses, and Block 3 involved two actions on two of three glasses. In Block 3 one glass is singled out through inaction, while in Block 1 and 2, one glass was singled out by virtue of actions performed. Block 3 was included to ensure that participants' responses were attributable to qualities of the action, rather than the fact that one glass was singled out. were provided no goal information.
[ Figure 1 and Figure 1 caption here]
Coding and Analysis
After each video the same questions were asked. When asked the forced-choice questions 'are the drinks the same' and 'is either/any drink special?', an affirmative response was coded as 1, with a negative response coded 0. Thus, a participant could score a maximum of 2 per block, where 2 affirms the quality on both trials, 1 indicates alternating responses, and a score of 0 represents no support for the quality. When asked to choose which drink they would select to drink, a score of 1 was awarded only if they selected a drink which had been acted-upon. Thus, 2 represents exclusive preference for the acted-upon object(s), 1 indicates alternating responses, and 0 indicates they consistently avoided the acted-upon drinks.
Such ordered categorical data is best treated with an Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR), but where the assumption of proportional odds was violated a Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR) was used. Unless otherwise stated, all OLR analyses satisfied this assumption. For more information on OLR and MLR please see Menard (2010) , Field (2013) and Kleinbaum & Klein (2010) .
Are the drinks the same?
Using an OLR, neither Block 1 (χ 2 (3) = 2.753, p = .431) nor Block 2 (χ 2 (3)= 
Is either drink special?
In Block 1 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ 2 (3)= 18.953, p < .001, indicating that a model with predictors was better than a model without predictors.
Pearson's Goodness-of-fit, χ 2 (7)= 3.234, p = .863, did not fall below the threshold for rejection (p < .05). As Table 1 .067 (Nagelkerke). Figure 3 shows the mean proportion of responses in each category with goal-information collapsed into action-type.
Thus, across all three blocks, when the modelled actions were opaque participants were more than twice as likely to report the presence of a special object within the set compared to causally transparent actions.
[ Table 1 and Table 1 caption In Block 1 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ 2 (6)= 156.715, p < .001. Pearson's Goodness-of-fit, χ 2 (4)= 5.087, p = .279, did not fall below the threshold for rejection (p < .05). As In Block 3 we found a significantly better final model fit, χ 2 (6)= 49.685, p < .001.
Pearson's Goodness-of-fit, χ 2 (4)= 14.129, p = .007, did fall below the threshold (p < .05), which suggests there are non-linearities in the data, and the model fit could be improved by their inclusion (Field, 2013) , a point discussed in the next section 'Exploratory Analysis'. As Table 2 shows, opacity does not significantly predict outcomes at Level 1.
However, it does make participants 1.78 times more likely to select the acted upon drink exclusively at Level 2.
Compared to no goal, a curse makes participants .49 times as likely to select the acted upon object once (Level 1), and .24 times as likely to select the acted upon object exclusively (Level 2). A blessing does not significantly predict responses at Level 1 or Level 2. Pseudo-R 2 values range from .048 (McFadden) to .110 (Nagelkerke).
In sum, across blocks, opacity increased likelihood of selecting an acted-upon object exclusively. Curses reliably decrease the likelihood of selection across both levels of the DV, and blessings generally increased the likelihood of selection.
[ Table 2 and Table 2 caption here]
Exploratory Analysis
An informed, post-hoc, decision was made to evaluate whether or not there was a significant interaction between Action-Type and Goal, as suggested by the Pearson's goodness-of-fit statistic on the desirability measure. All analyses were re-run including an interaction term. Using an OLR, the pattern of results remained identical for 'same' and 'special' and no interaction was observed (as one would expect, given the pattern of results in the a priori analyses). Using an MLR, a significant interaction between ActionType and Goal was observed in drink preferences (as implied by the Pearson goodnessof-fit statistic), and the pattern of results remained largely intact (i.e., opacity had a significant and positive impact at level 2 across all three blocks). However, the influence of Goal Information varied. Due to the difficulty in describing interactions of nominal categorical IVs on ordinal categorical DVs with respect to a reference category we ran two separate analyses. First, we manually split our data by Action-Type, then ran an OLR to determine the influence of Goal on drink preference for those who observed ordinary actions, and a separate OLR on drink preference for those who observed ritualized actions. The results of these analyses (including tests of assumptions) can be seen in Table 3 . For ordinary actions, in Block 1 and 2 we found that Goal information influenced drink preference in the expected directions at similar magnitudes as before. In Block 3, no effect of goal information was observed, indeed, the model fit was not significant. For opaque actions, curses made participants significantly less likely to select acted-upon objects at each level across all three blocks. Interestingly, blessings had no effect on participants' responses in any block. While both positive and negative goal information appears to influence participant perceptions for transparent actions, only negative goal information influences perceptions of opaque actions.
All analysis (see table 3) satisfied the assumption of proportional odds, and model fitness (except for the effect of goal information on transparent actions in Block 3, (χ2 (2) =2.404, p =.301).
[ Table 3 and Table 3 Table 4 shows the coded qualitative responses with regard to their understanding of 'Same' and Table 5 shows the coded qualitative responses for 'Special'.
The lead author developed a coding system based on the existing responses, and informed by previous work by ) Menard (2010 and predictions of the Action-Parsing system Zacks, 2004a [ Table 4 and Table 4 caption here]
[ Table 5 and Table 5 caption here]
Participant Demographics
Participants completed a 'Religiosity Scale' (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975) , and a scale assessing their 'History of religious and ritual exposure' . Religiosity was measured on 3-subscales and aggregated into a single 5-point measure (M = 2.24; SD = 1.29; α = .95) while history of religious and ritual exposure comprised 3 sub-scales (5-items on Superstitious Rituals, 8-items on Cultural Rituals, and 3-items on Religious Rituals). These scales were converted to a 6-points for aggregation (M = 2.92; SD = .71; α = .81). Religiosity and Ritual exposure were moderately correlated at r = .562, p < .01. No systematic pattern correlation between these scales and the dependent variables was observed.
Discussion
In this work we aimed to dissociate the roles of goal-demotion and causal opacity in adults' processing of ritualized actions. First, neither action-type nor goal-information influenced participants' perceptions of whether or not the objects were the 'same', with the vast majority interpreting sameness in terms of physical qualities of the object.
Opaque actions reliably caused attributions of specialness, while goal-information had no effect. Indeed, the majority of participants organically defined specialness with reference to the actions or focus of the actor. Further, opaque actions made participants much more likely to exclusively prefer acted-upon objects. Such actions did not influence preference on only one trial, suggesting (for some people) ritualized actions provide a categorical imperative to select ritualized objects always. Critically, curses made objects less desirable: any action labelled a curse considerably increased avoidance. This is consistent with other work, in which people tend to be cautious of things that are 'magically dangerous' (Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002) or essentially corrupted (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994; Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986; Savani, Kumar, Naidu, & Dweck, 2011 interesting dissociation between causal opacity and goal-demotion. Opacity informs our understanding of an object's status, while Goal-Information and opacity inform our approach/avoid behavior toward such objects. Moreover, while negative GoalInformation causes aversion, positive Goal-Information does not always cause approach behavior above-and-beyond variance attributable to opacity.
Other researchers have produced equally interesting work on this dissociation, modelling potential differences in action parsing attributable to these qualities (Nielbo & Sørensen, 2015; Sørensen & Nielbo, 2013) . They report that 'cultural priors' tend to increase the degree to which cultural experts (those experienced and expert in a given ritual tradition, for example, a priest) see a ritualized act as ordinary and instrumental compared to one who is not a cultural expert. Thus, it is possible that actions are not necessarily treated equally in the minds of all individuals. Our ritual condition included a number of causally opaque and goal demoted actions, but also included bowing -a highly familiar, abstract action that carries pre-existing culture-dependent associations of respect and reverence. Any individual familiar, or 'expert', in the role a bow serves may rely heavily (and perhaps exclusively) on this action at the expense of the novel actions in determining an objects' significance. However, we do not think this is the case here.
When participants were asked how they defined special, only six participants (of 484) made explicit reference to the bow. Of those 6, all made reference to the bow as one of multiple actions (e.g., 'He … did something to the particular glass… i.
e. hum at it or bow to it' and 'I took it to mean if it ['specialness'] was gestured to via the flapping or sound
or bowing'), and the two responses which appeared to make the strongest case for bowing without referencing other actions explicitly still included other generalities associated with the novel actions (i.e., 'Objects were treated with respect, and bowed head as a offering' and 'more elaborate ritual, the bowing and offering'). Given that participants in the ritual conditions saw six bows (across six videos) and up to three different kinds of ritualized actions, and only six made reference to the bow, four of whom made explicit reference to other ritualized actions, we do not believe the bow was privileged above-and-beyond the other actions."
Differences in how the term 'special' was understood across conditions revealed different levels of action-parsing. Causally opaque actions caused parsing at the lowest level (gesture) and generated an appeal to the actor's inner state. This is consistent with empirical work (Nielbo & Sorensen, 2011; Zacks, 2004a; Zacks et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2001 ) and theoretical predictions . It is nevertheless worth noting that ritual videos were typically slightly longer than the control videos, and the ritual videos contained two extra event-boundaries not generated by causal opacity: the redundant raising prior to pouring action, and the use of two hands (rather than one hand) in the bow/inspection action at the end of the sequence. However, the extent to which these two additional boundaries contributed to the overall effect is likely to be relatively minor. Ritual actions, by their causally opaque nature, generate more additional boundaries than ordinary actions, and so, the difference in perceived event boundaries between the two conditions is already considerably weighted in favor of the ritual condition. Further, this falls fully under the umbrella of cognitive capturethese two additional boundaries further captured participants, which in turn, likely increased the motivation to restore behavioral understanding. Finally, we are not making the claim that a specific number of subunits of action make a ritual special or efficacious (though this is an interesting question), we are simply making the argument that a greater number of subunits (generated by opacity and goal demotion) motivates participants to restore a behavioral explanation for the actions, which begets appeals to the actor's goals.
We found evidence in support of this position. However, we are cautious, and maintain this is only modest evidence for the role of cognitive capture.
Ritualized actions activate cognitive systems outside the proper range causing participants to process actions at a lower-level, in turn, motivating a search for the actions' meaning to restore default {behavioral} parsing and understanding (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielbo & Sorensen, 2011; Rossano, 2012; Zacks, 2004a; Zacks et al., 2007; Zacks et al., 2001) . Lacking a clear way to integrate this experience, we interpret these deliberate causally opaque actions as socially normative (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielsen et al., 2015) . Boyer and Liénard have argued that cultural rituals are a special case of ritualized behavior:
Mis-activations of the hazard-system are calibrated throughout childhood, and adult responses are constrained to a limited repertoire of learned behaviors. We suggest the dominant calibrated response is to interpret the actions as normative. Further, we believe the phenomenon of overimitation may be the mechanism of calibration. Overimitation occurs when children copy obviously causally-irrelevant actions within a larger sequence of adult-modeled behavior: When children observe these redundant, repetitive, goaldemoted, causally-opaque acts they interpret them normatively and conventionally (Kenward, 2012) . Additionally, they copy with high-fidelity (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Marcris, & Keil, 2011) and do so reliably across cultures (Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2014; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) . It is possible our observations reflect this calibration -ritualized actions activate the Precaution System which has been calibrated throughout development to respond in a normative manner (notably, adults are more likely to overimitate than children; McGuigan et al., 2011) . We believe over-imitation/calibration explains why providing positive goal information (a blessing) doesn't influence behavior toward goal-demoted acts.
We propose, as predicted by the Hazard-Precaution system, that over the course of development we begin to understand many actions as socially normative, particularly casually-opaque and goal-demoted actions (via over-imitation). Further, as predicted by the Action-Parsing system, ritualized actions are parsed differently from ordinary actions due to the absence of a plausible causal mechanism and the obscurity of the actor's goals; ritualized actions are necessarily interpreted at the level of {gesture} rather than
[behavior], resulting in 'cognitive capture'. Such capture occurs when the PrecautionSystem activates outside the 'proper range' of stimuli, motivating us to restore a
[behavioral] understanding. Thus, lacking a clear schema for why an action is being performed, and due to calibration in childhood, we interpret these actions as socially normative, as described by the Ritual Stance. More work needs to be done delineating how this process operates, work well outside the scope of the present study. Though it is notable that each of the distinct approaches has been previously validated and empirically supported.
While rituals only emerged as a part of our behavioral repertoire in recent evolutionary history, their ubiquity suggests they serve an adaptive role. Rituals, as intentional motor acts, are unique: they disrupt our capacity to infer a causal mechanism, they deny us insight into an actor's inner-state, and they activate cognitive systems adapted to other purposes. Understanding each of these elements is complicated, but here we contribute to the growing body of evidence that illustrates the importance each element plays. Moreover, we have taken modest steps toward dissociating the influence of goal-demotion from causal opacity, and have attempted to unify into a causal chain Figure Captions . Figure 1 . Images show the 'Cloth' ritual acted upon the center glass. Steps 1 and 2 are identical for both the ritual and control conditions: the demonstrator moves the large glasses in front of the small glasses. In
Step 3 the cloth is waved vigorously at the glass (ritual), while in the control condition the cloth is used to clean the glass. In step 4 the small glass is raised before being poured into the large glass, while in the control condition the small glass is poured directly. In step 5 the glass is raised with both hands and bowed to (ritual), while in the control condition it is raised with one hand and inspected. Finally, the demonstrator returns to a neutral position. (From Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015) . 
